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A Growing Consensus: State Sponsorship of
Confederate Symbols is an Injury-in-Fact as a
Result of Dylann Roof’s Killing Blacks in
Church at a Bible Study
L. Darnell Weeden ⃰

I. INTRODUCTION
“The current debates over Confederate symbols were
ignited by Dylann Roof’s murder of nine black churchgoers in
Charleston, S.C. in 2015. The racially motivated killings
produced new opposition to Confederate icons in public
spaces.” 1 As New Orleans officials eliminated the statue of
Louisiana native son and Confederate General P.G.T.
Beauregard on May 17, 2017, they provided an example of how
to start the process of making right the national shame of
honoring people who led the battle to protect Southern
slavery. 2 “No matter how artfully apologists attempt to
promote a romanticized Southern heritage, the Confederacy
waged war on the United States primarily for the preservation
of slavery.” 3 Regarding the implication of Confederate symbols,
such as the Confederate flag and monuments honoring Civil

�
Roberson King Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern
University; B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi. I give a particular expression of gratitude to my
wife and children for their forbearance as I developed this article. The author would like to
thank my colleague, Associate Professor Shaundra K. Lewis, for her valuable feedback, and
Daniel Caldwell, Thurgood Marshall School of Law Class of 2019, for his assistance.
1. Logan Strother et al, The Confederate Flag Largely Disappeared After the Civil
War, WASHINGTON POST, June 12, 2017, 2017 WLNR 18023240.
2. Yohuru Williams, Confederate Symbols, Statues Whitewash Shameful History,
THE BULLETIN (Norwich, Conn.), May 31, 2017 at A7, 2017 WLNR 16865869.
3. Id.
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War generals, the battle has gone on for decades. 4 However,
the murder of black parishioners in June of 2015 at the
Emanuel A.M.E. Church caused the issue to surge in the
regular news media. 5 “The Confederate flag, monuments and
memorials are not harmless remembrances of an honorable
war, but of our deepest shame as a nation. They are symbols of
hate, representative of an inglorious past built on the immoral
underpinnings of racial slavery.” 6
Karl Oliver, a member of the Mississippi House of
Representatives, is an unabashed, enthusiastic endorser of all
Confederate symbols. 7 Oliver clearly disagrees with those who
want confederate symbols to be removed from taxpayer
sponsored parks and public spaces. 8 Unlike Oliver, some people
would limit the display of Confederate symbols honoring the
lost cause to private forums by private owners. 9 Representative
Oliver, according to one commentator, “has managed to make
himself a national embarrassment by calling for the lynching of
elected officials in New Orleans for removing Confederate
symbols — including a 20-foot tall statue of Civil War Gen.
Robert E. Lee.” 10 However, Oliver does not appear to be as
dangerous as Roof, who wrapped himself in symbols of the
Confederacy prior to executing nine African-American
worshippers in church in South Carolina in 2015. 11 “Roof’s
murderous rampage started a renewed effort to get rid
of Confederate symbols from public spaces. Hopefully Oliver’s

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
Id..
See Otis Sanford, Opinion, Lynching Comment National Disgrace, CLARION-

LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), May 28, 2017, at C4, 2017 WLNR 16534184 (Sanford holds the
Hardin Chair of Excellence in Journalism and Strategic Media at the University of Memphis).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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dangerous and asinine comments will help complete the push,
once and for all.” 12
The process of removing four Confederate statutes in
New Orleans, including one of General Robert E. Lee, began
two years ago after the gunman, Roof, struggled to promote a
do-it-yourself ‘race war’ by murdering nine individuals during a
Bible study at a historic Charleston, S.C. church. 13 Many cities
do not have the courage to follow the City of New Orleans’s
example regarding the proper treatment of the public display of
Confederate symbols in a public forum by public officials. 14 A
rational case for engaging in a public debate about whether the
public display of southern Confederate symbols represents
sound or poor public policy is both necessary and proper. 15
“And shame on us if it takes another atrocity for the discussion
to start. Our past is meaningless if we don’t use it to find a path
to a better future.” 16
Biloxi, Mississippi is now directly involved in a current
southern clash regarding Confederate symbols after its
Republican Mayor, Andrew “FoFo” Gilich, mandated in April
2017 that the Mississippi State flag be removed from city
buildings. 17 Mississippi is the last state flag in America to
display the Confederate battle symbol. 18 The Mississippi flag
became subject to passionate analysis after the self-proclaimed
white supremacist Roof slew nine black participants at a Bible
Study in a church in June of 2015. 19 It is now well known that
Roof posed for pictures while embracing and possessing the

12. Id.
13. Editorial, Don’t Wait for Another Hate-Warped Gun Rampage to Force Action on
Confederate Memorials, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 25, 2017, 2017 WLNR 16249697.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. See Emily Pettus, ‘Fly The Flag’? Rift in Mississippi over Confederate Symbol,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 2017, 2017 WLNR 16066908.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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rebel Confederate flag. 20 “Instead of waiting for a top-down
decision, many cities and counties and all eight public
universities [in Mississippi] have acted on their own to remove
the flag from display since 2015.” 21 Biloxi Mayor Gilich had the
Mississippi flag removed from city buildings during April of
2017 because he thinks the Confederate symbol causes people
to sense that they are not welcome. 22 “Hospitality is important
in Biloxi, a diverse city that is home to an Air Force base and
has an economy heavily dependent on tourists who gamble in
casinos and sunbathe on white-sand beaches,” 23 so a pragmatic
Mayor Gilich’s goal is to make sure that everybody feels
welcome in Biloxi. 24
Contrary to the modern trend in the courts, 25 any individual
living in Mississippi has traditional standing under common law
to challenge Mississippi’s state flag on equal protection grounds
as a public injury. 26 The state’s display of the flag at statesponsored activities and on state properties constitutes
government hate speech endorsing racial prejudice since the
Confederate flag, a racist Confederate symbol, represents
slavery, racial animus, and inequality. Part II highlights the
ongoing debate about how society should treat the problematic
historic legacy of the Confederacy. Part II of this article
emphasizes that denying state governments the ability to
sponsor Confederate symbols is necessary. This denial is
necessary since these symbols honor the supporters of slavery;
Southern history shows a direct connection to the Confederacy
and slavery. As a rule in the litigated cases generally, plaintiffs
See id.
Id.
Id.
See Pettus, supra note 17.
See id.
See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169–70 (1992) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

(1970)).
26.
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challenging state-sponsored use of Confederate symbols have
not been successful because courts have misunderstood the
nature of their public Article III injuries. 27 “There is no
evidence of constitutional limits on the power to grant
standing. In both England and America, actions by strangers, or
by citizens in general, were fully permissible and indeed
familiar. There is no basis for the view that . . . English and . . .
American conception of adjudication forbade suits by . . .
citizens.” 28 Part III reveals the injury-in-fact was not a historical
requirement to establish a violation of a private right: Since
Article III standing may apply to either public or private
injuries, a private injury-in-fact is unnecessary to guarantee the
separation of powers under an Article III theory. 29 Part IV
makes the claim that the Mississippi flag, with its incorporated
Confederate symbol, violates the Constitution because the
state’s use of its flag allows a reasonable observer to believe the
Mississippi flag represents government speech endorsing racial
subordination in violation of the principle of equal protection.
Mississippi’s sponsorship of a Confederate symbol in its flag
constitutes invidious government speech under the equal
protection clause because racial history matters. Mississippi’s
long-standing, racially-tainted political process prohibits
African Americans, a racial minority in the state, from using the
normal political process as a tool to remove the Confederate
flag symbol, a form of symbolic government speech, from the
state’s flag. Part V makes the case that Mississippi’s public
universities are plausible successful plaintiffs to challenge
Mississippi’s sponsorship of a Confederate symbol in its official
flag under the controversial conventional standing rules. In
conclusion, Part V maintains that the judges in the Confederate

27. Id. at 167.
28. Id. at 171.
29. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
275, 299 (2008) (citations omitted).
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flag cases who have blindly followed the personal injury-in-fact
requirement of standing have in fact denied deserving plaintiffs,
who are descendants of slaves, relief from state sponsorship of
odious discriminatory Confederate government speech, which
sends a message of white supremacy.

II. AN ONGOING DEBATE ABOUT HOW SOCIETY
SHOULD TREAT THE HISTORIC PROBLEMATIC
LEGACY OF THE CONFEDERACY
A simple but profound question regarding the public
display of Confederate symbols has challenged towns, counties,
and states throughout the South over many years: “What place
do symbols honoring a failed rebellion, one that fought for the
right to subjugate people, have in a modern society?” 30 In May
2017, after another expanded Rebel flag fight in Henry County,
Georgia, Jason Pye, a politically active libertarian who has a
Rebel ancestor, has rather insightfully answered the
Confederate symbols question by advising his southern friends
and family to remember: “It’s over. The South lost; let it go. . .
. Until people accept that, people will continue to spend money
to honor slavery.” 31
“Confederate symbols do not appeal directly to racial
animus. Still, the politics of Confederate symbols have not
changed completely: In surveys of whites, racial animus
correlates strongly with support for Confederate symbols.
Opponents of these symbols continue to make the connection
to race.” 32

30. Bill Torpy, Opinion, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Torpy at Large column,
ATLANTA J. CONST., May 30, 2017, 2017 WLNR 16699122.
31. Id. (quoting Jason Pye, a politically active libertarian).
32. Strother et al., supra note 1.
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A. Confederate Flags and Monuments as Honoring Slavery
There is a Southern divide on the treatment of
Confederate symbols. For example, Brandenburg, Kentucky,
located about 40 miles southwest of Louisville, gladly accepted
on Monday, May 29, 2017, Memorial Day, a monument
honoring Confederate soldiers, after the University of
Louisville removed the same monument as an unwanted
symbol of slavery. 33 After protests and because of student and
faculty disapproval, in April of 2016 the University of Louisville
declared that it would remove the monument, which had been
established in 1895. 34
The debate regarding removing a Confederate statue
from the property outside of the Hillsborough County
Courthouse is unquestionably long overdue and should be
quickly resolved in favor of removal because, “How can a
government purporting to represent every citizen salute those
who fought to deny equality to every citizen?” 35 It is a valid
assertion to contend a person looking for justice in a
courthouse should not be required implicitly to acknowledge a
symbol of racial injustice. 36 Regardless of the historically
sanitized discussion, “the Confederate Constitution clearly
indicates that if the Confederacy had won, it would have
continued slavery in the South and possibly extended it to new
territories.” 37
Controversies regarding the removal of public
Confederate monuments in New Orleans and Charlottesville,
Virginia simply highlight an ongoing debate about how society
33. Bryan Woolston, Kentucky Town Welcomes Confederate Monument, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 30, 2017, at 11, 2017 WLNR 16689406.
34. Kentucky Town Rededicates Confederate Memorial Moved from Louisville, WASH.
POST (Wash., D.C.), May 30, 2017, at A02, 2017 WLNR 16684871.
35. Ernest Hooper, Battle Goes Beyond Removing Confederate Symbols, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (FL), May 29, 2017, at 1, 2017 WLNR 16630992.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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should treat the historic legacy of the Confederacy. 38 Ilya
Somin agrees with conservative columnist Jeff Jacoby,
libertarian Ronald Bailey, and others who believe that the
government should remove Southern Confederate symbols
when they are intended to honor the supporters of the legacy of
slavery. 39 According to Somin, the Confederate symbols issue
has evolved to this uncomplicated plan: “the government
should not honor people whose principal claim to fame is that
they fought a bloody war in defense of the evil institution of
slavery.” 40 Ultimately, Somin argues that both Confederate
monuments and the Confederate flag should disappear from
public spaces of honor because the main goal of the
Confederates during the secession from the United States was
to preserve the enslavement of African Americans. 41
Mississippi’s official justification for its secession clearly
indicated a very close link between secession and maintaining
the institution of slavery. 42 Mississippi argued that because
products produced by slave labor had “become necessities of
the world, and a blow at slavery is a blow at commerce and
civilization. That blow has been long aimed at the institution . .
. and . . . reaching its consummation. There was no choice left
us but submission to the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution
of the Union.” 43

38. Ilya Somin, The Case for Taking Down Confederate Monuments, WASH. POST,
May 17, 2017, 2017 WLNR 15340103.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Mississippi’s official statement outlining its reason for secession).
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B. Southern History Shows a Direct Connection to the
Confederacy and Slavery
Supporters of the Confederate flag often attempt to
deny that it represents their Southern heritage of slavery. 44
Reginald Hildebrand, a professor emeritus of history at the
University of North Carolina, concedes it is conceivable the
Civil War involved more than one issue, although “it would be
hard to argue slavery was not the key issue.” 45 On this issue,
Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens delivered the
Cornerstone Speech in Savannah, Georgia, just prior to the
Confederacy setting off shots at Ft. Sumter which started the
Civil War. 46 “Our new government is founded upon exactly
[this] idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon
the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man;
that slavery subordination to the superior race, is his natural
and normal condition.” 47 University of North Carolina Law
Professor Al Brophy asserts that regardless of how one feels
about Southern heritage, a “compelling” case exists for
removing Confederate symbols from public settings. 48 The
Confed-erate flag in 2017 represents a “symbol of white
supremacy and that is the message it sends.” 49
The statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee
became the last of New Orleans’s four confederate monuments
removed from the public square. 50 The removal of Lee’s statue
marked the end of 130 years of publicly honoring a person who

44. Mark Schultz, Chapel Hill Panel Debates Confederate Flag in Schools, HERALD
SUN (Durham NC), May 21, 2017, at 854, 2017 WLNR 15791043.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Reginald Hildebrand).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Al Brophy).
50. Janell Ross, New Orleans Removes Confederacy Monuments, WASH. POST, May
21, 2017, at A01, 2017 WLNR 15692612.
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symbolized Southern pride and racial oppression. 51 Mayor
Mitch Landrieu celebrated this historic occasion with an
inspiring speech in a diplomatic attempt to end almost two
years of intense discussion in New Orleans regarding the
historical significance of the monuments. 52 “They are not just
innocent remembrances of a benign history. These monuments
celebrate a fictional sanitized Confederacy ignoring the death,
ignoring the enslavement, ignoring the terror that it actually
stood for.” 53 Landrieu said that because Lee and the
Confederate army fought against the United States, they were
soldiers who were not patriots. 54

C. Plaintiffs’ Challenging State-Sponsored Use of Confederate
Symbols as a General Rule Have Not Been Successful
Little legitimate precedent is available regarding statesupported utilization of Confederate symbolic speech, and the
courts that have judged the issue have generally rejected the
removal of Confederate flags by strictly construing the First,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 55 Plaintiffs have also
been unsuccessful in having Confederate symbols removed
from the public square because the courts have misunderstood
the nature of their public Article III injury. 56 Cases that have
analyzed state sponsorship of the Confederate issue outside of
the context of school desegregation requirements have rejected
removal of Confederate flags as mandated by the equal
protection principle. 57 The Eleventh Circuit refused to order
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu).
Id.
Kathleen Riley, The Long Shadow of the Confederacy in America’s Schools: StateSponsored Use of Confederate Symbols in the Wake of Brown v. Board, 10 WM. & MARY BILL
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

OF RIGHTS J.

525, 532–534 (2002).
56. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 167.
57. Id.
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the removal of the Confederate flag from atop the Alabama
capitol building in NAACP v. Hunt. 58 In Hunt, the Eleventh
Circuit rebuffed the NAACP’s claim that a state-sponsored use
of the Confederate flag violated the Constitution; the court
decided that the NAACP plaintiffs were not sufficiently
deprived of the constitutional right of equal protection to
constitute a recognizable injury thereby. 59
If the premise is true that a racially motivated statute
may be unconstitutional even if it is facially neutral, then it is
equally true that since Alabama flew the Confederate flag for
racially discriminatory reasons, Alabama flying the flag violates
the equal protection principle. 60 Although there was no state
law mandating the flying of the Confederate flag, Alabama
raised the flag in 1961 for purposes of honoring the 100th
anniversary of a Civil War fought to support black
enslavement. 61 “The flag was raised again on the morning of
April 25, 1963, the day that United States Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy travelled to Montgomery to discuss with
then-Governor George Wallace the governor’s announced
intention to block the admission of the first black students to
the University of Alabama.” 62 To reasonable observers
considering the context in which Alabama raised its prosegregation Confederate flag symbol, the state of Alabama
obviously intended flying the flag atop the capitol dome to
advance the message that it was playing its race card to appease
white segregationist at the expense of the right of blacks to the
equal protection of the law. 63 Moreover, there is an unequal

58. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990) (superseded by rule as stated
in Stadium Book & Video, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 2006 WL 2374740 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
59. Id. at 1562.
60. Contra Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231–32 (1985) (declined to extend by
Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 2014)).
61. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1558.
62. Id.
63. See id.
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application of the state policy since it should now be common
knowledge that even if all people of all races are exposed to the
flag, black people, living in the state because of a history of
slavery and Jim Crow, are disproportionally injured when
Alabama flies that flag over its capitol. 64
In Mississippi Division of the United Sons of

Confederate Veterans v. Mississippi State Conference of
NAACP Branches, the NAACP unsuccessfully pursued

declaratory relief and an injunction prohibiting any future
purchases, displays, maintenance, or expenditures of public
funds on the Mississippi Flag with its incorporated Confederate
symbol. 65 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the
NAACP’s argument that the flying of the Mississippi state flag
violates its members’ constitutional rights to equal protection as
guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution because the
NAACP failed to meet the threshold question of constitutional
injury. 66 In Daniels, 67 the Mississippi Court decided that the
flying of a Confederate battle flag by county officials did not
violate constitutionally protected rights because there is no
injury under the standing requirement. 68 In Moore v. Bryant,
the plaintiff in a 2016 case unsuccessfully challenged the
Mississippi state flag because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
an injury-in-fact. 69 After following a wrongheaded revisionist
interpretation of an Article III personal-injury-in-fact standing
requirement, 70 a federal district court held the plaintiff did not
have standing to challenge the Mississippi flag as

64. Id. at 1562.
65. Miss. Div. of United Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Miss. State Conference of
NAACP Branches, 774 So. 2d 388, 388–89 (Miss. 2000).
66. Id. at 390.
67. Daniels v. Harrison County Bd. of Supervisors, 722 So. 2d 136, 139 (Miss. 1998).
68. Miss. Div. of the United Sons of Confederate Veterans, 774 So. 2d at 390.
69. Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 858 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
70. Sunstein, supra note 25 at 167.
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unconstitutional because he did not in fact suffer a recognizable
personal injury. 71
According to Cass R. Sunstein, the “injury-in-fact” test
represents a revisionist interpretation of Article III. 72 Since the
injury-in-fact test is without an identifiable constitutional
source, it appears that the Supreme Court just made up the
“injury-in-fact” concept. 73 Sunstein contends that the Article III
theory that “the plaintiff must suffer an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” 74 is not
really mandated by the Constitution. 75
While following the revisionist interpretation of Article
76
III, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny
standing to Moore. 77 Moore challenged the constitutionality of
Mississippi flag by articulating an injury-in-fact theory made up
by the Supreme Court. 78 This theory posits that “the
requirement that a litigant have standing derives from Article
III of the Constitution.” 79
Under this injury-in-fact theory, the Fifth Circuit
declared that, at an irreducible constitutional minimum,
standing required plaintiff Moore to have experienced an
injury-in-fact which involves “an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 80
The constitutional challenge to the Mississippi flag in
Moore v. Bryant should have caused the court to recognize that
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Moore, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 834, 858.
Sunstein, supra note 25 at 185.
Id. at 168
Moore, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 850.
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 185.
Id. at 185–86.
Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 185.
Moore, 853 F.3d at 248.

Id.
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society has developed new standards of civil rights regarding
state-sponsored use of Confederate symbols, 81 and that, under
the standing rules, the first element of standing is injury-in-fact.
The federal appeals court disregarded Moore’s claim that he
suffered injury-in-fact because the Mississippi state flag
stigmatized him. 82 The court rejected Moore’s stigmatic injury
argument because, according to the court’s revisionist
interpretation of Article III, 83 “stigmatic injury accords a basis
for standing only to those persons who are personally denied
equal treatment” by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” 84
It is now time for courts to accept the societal standard
that state sponsorship of Confederate symbols is a violation of
the principle of equal protection. It is relatively easy for a court
to find that state sponsorship of a Confederate flag creates
invidious racial discrimination where, by adopting “widely
accepted academic critiques, the Court is flatly wrong to claim
historical support for a constitutional requirement of standing,
particularly for the requirement that private parties show some
sort of individualized injury before they can proceed in federal
court.” 85 Unfortunately, courts have failed to recognize the
harm produced by Mississippi’s sponsorship of a Confederate
symbol in its flag because, according to Cass Sunstein, the
twentieth-century Supreme Court wrongly incorporated “a
private-law model of standing” into the Constitution. 86

81. See Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834 (S.D. Miss. 2016); See also Kathleen
Riley, The Long Shadow of the Confederacy in America’s Schools: State-Sponsored Use of
Confederate Symbols in the Wake Of Brown v. Board, supra note 55 at 531–32.
82. Moore, 853 F.3d at 249.
83. Sunstein, supra note 25 at 185 (internal quotations omitted).
84. Moore, 853 F.3d at 249 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)).
85. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 690 (2004).
86. Id. at 691 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433 (1988)).
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III.PROOF OF THE PRIVATE INJURY-IN-FACT IS NOT A
HISTORICAL REQUIREMENT UNDER ARTICLE III
This article supports the beliefs that the Constitution,
under Article III, does not mandate, and history does not
require, private injury-in-fact for a party to have standing.
Contemporary standing law requires a private plaintiff suing in
federal court to prove that she has endured “injury-in-fact,”
that the injury is legitimately linked to the conduct of the
defendant, and that a favorable decision from the court can
remedy the private injury. 87 F. Andrew Hessick insists that the
private injury-in-fact require-ment is unnecessary because
neither American nor English law practice originally required
factual harm. 88 Historical practice does not support the
argument that a private injury-in-fact is (or should be)
mandated by Article III. 89

A. Article III Standing Should Apply to Public Injuries or
Private Injuries
From both a historical and contemporary perspective,
the concept of standing may involve either “public rights”
(injuries) or “private rights” (injuries). 90 Public rights are rights
possessed by the community at large. 91 Public rights include the
common benefit incurred by general compliance with
controlling substantive law, 92 which may include the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution. 93 The consequences for
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Hessick, supra note 29, at 276.
Id. at 299.
Id. (citations omitted).
Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 85, at 693 et seq.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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violations of public consti-tutional rights “are not measured
strictly by private loss[.]” 94 The proper role of standing is not
solely to compensate individuals for their private losses but also
to provide a forum for members of the community to vindicate
claims that the law of the land was broken. 95 Private rights,
however, are those possessed by a distinct person, 96 and
“include an individual’s common law rights in property and
bodily integrity, as well as in enforcing contracts.” 97
Nevertheless, “private rights may generally be distinguished by
private law’s focus on individual compensation (or the
avoidance of private loss by injunctive remedies).” 98 Steven
Winter, supported by Professor Sunstein, has concluded that
American courts initially allowed a private person “‘who had no
personal interest or injury-in-fact’ to initiate and conduct
mandamus actions on behalf of the public at large.” 99 In today’s
America there should be very little doubt that allowing any
Mississippian to challenge the state’s display of a Confederate
symbol in its flag supports the greater community’s
constitutional interest of eliminating state-sponsored
endorsement of racial discrimination.

B. A Private Injury-in-Fact Requirement is Not Needed to
Guarantee the Separation of Powers Under Article III
The failure to include a private injury-in-fact
requirement for more than a hundred years following the
Constitution’s ratification is very strong evidence that the
personal injury-in-fact mandate is unnecessary to implement

Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 85, at 693 et seq.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 708. See supra note 94 (quoting Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1377 (1988)).
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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federal judicial power. 100 If injury-in-fact were truly necessary
to guarantee the separation of powers between the three
branches of the federal government, the Court would have
embraced the injury-in-fact mandate prior to 1970. 101 Similarly,
if the injury-in-fact mandate were essential, the Court would
have developed a dependable and uniform rationale for it. 102
The Court requirement of injury-in-fact should be rejected
because, with a flag that conveys sympathy for the goals of
white supremacy, “the function of courts is to provide relief to
those who have suffered a legally cognizable injury.” 103 This
should also apply to harm from state-sponsored symbolic
governmental
speech.
“So,
why
does
current standing doctrine require injury-in-fact? The most
likely reason is that it is firmly entrenched in the law.” 104
Cass R. Sunstein correctly explained that the “injury-infact” test is both relatively new and also represents a revisionist
interpretation of Article III. 105 Although the injury-in-fact
requirement does not have any textual or historical backing, the
Court recognized injury-in-fact as a constitutional
requirement. 106 Sunstein appropriately contends that the
concept of “injury in fact is heavily dependent on an assessment
of law instead of being a law-free inquiry into facts.” 107 More
fundamentally, a basic belief in an “injury-in-fact” theory is
more than a misinterpretation of Article III, because it
additionally represents a considerable conceptual error. 108 The
judicial treatment of standing as a constitutional law issue is an
extremely modern occurrence, since no court utilized the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Hessick, supra note 29, at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Sunstein, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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expression “injury-in-fact” prior to 1970. 109 There is simply no
favorable evidence mandating an “injury-in-fact” other than the
basic requirement that an identifiable legal theory grants a
plaintiff a cause of action. 110 Since the personal injury-in-fact
test lacks an identifiable constitutional source, it appears that
the Supreme Court invented the ‘injury-in-fact’ concept. 111 The
author, a native Mississippian, contends federal courts should
not deny plaintiffs like Moore an opportunity to prove on the
merits that Mississippi’s flag violates the equal protection of the
law concept under a made-up Article III personal injury-in-fact
standing requirement. 112

IV.THE CONFEDERATE FLAG WHEN INCORPORATED IN
A STATE FLAG IS RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
GOVERNMENT SPEECH PROHIBITED UNDER AN
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Carlos Moore, an African-American attorney and a
citizen of Mississippi, is the plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging
Mississippi’s display of its state flag. 113 Moore asserts that
Mississippi’s state flag, which incorporates the Confederate
flag, is race-based, harmful government speech prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 114
Although the First Amendment does not prohibit
the government from speaking, 115 the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the government from intentionally conveying a

109. Id. at 169 (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)).
110. Id. at 178.
111. Id. at 185.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
113. Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 837 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
114. Id.
115. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 1195, 1198
(2016).
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message that creates a strong inference of support for racial
discrimination
and
subordination. 116
The
state
of
Mississippi could easily function with a race-neutral state flag if
denied the ability to promote a message of racial segregation in
its flag. Because the Mississippi flag is a form of government
speech that opposes racial equality, it injures the general public,
and any Mississippian should be able to file a constitutional
claim against the state. Professor Alexander Tsesis properly
recognized the progressive position taken by Helen
Norton that government speech promoting racial discriminatio
n may violate Equal Protection principles. 117

A. The Government Speech Doctrine Does Not Allow a State
to Sponsor a Flag with a Governmental Message of White
Supremacy
Even if the First Amendment does not restrain
the government’s expression, the equal protection prohibition
on racially discriminatory purposes should apply to a state flag
with a Confederate symbol that virtually says on its face that it
is racially discriminatory. 118 It should not be controversial to
prohibit the government from speaking in a manner that
welcomes racial discrimination and racial intolerance. When a
state government displays a flag that incorporates a
Confederate symbol, it is engaging in prohibited government
speech, because it is sending a message of support for racial
discrimination that is inconsistent with the principle of equal
protection. Because the Court has not clearly stated what
speech represents government speech, the cases addressing the

116. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
117. Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1145, 1178 n.180 (2013) (citing Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications
of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 163 (2012)).
118. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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government speech theory are often inconsistent. 119
Nevertheless, the Court implies that the government speech
doctrine is associated with a situation where it is obvious the
government is endorsing private speech. 120 One example of this
can be seen when school officials place limits on expressive
speech in public schools that members of the public might
reasonably believe has the approval and support of the school. 121
It is my position that, under an Equal Protection Clause
analysis, the government speech doctrine requires the judiciary
to find that the presence of a Confederate symbol in the
Mississippi flag is unconstitutional. This is because a reasonable
observer would likely view a state flag incorporating a
Confederate symbol in the courtroom or public square as
expressive speech supporting white supremacy with the
approval and support of the state of Mississippi. Therefore,
displaying the Mississippi state flag inherently violates the
principle of equal protection. The Court categorized some
controversies before it as involving government speech. 122
Under the government speech doctrine, “when the government
speaks, individuals and groups cannot use the Free Speech
Clause to challenge a government message that conflicts with
private viewpoints.” 123 In effect, the government speech
doctrine allows the government to engage in its own speech to
end any private speech that the government concludes is
objectionable. 124
The Court appropriately warned that the government
speech doctrine is subject to constitutional constraints. 125 For

119.
120.
121.
122.

Papandrea, supra note 115, at 1199.

Id.
Id.

Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, When Government Speaks: An Examination of the
Evolving Government Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L. REP. 753, 754 (Feb. 16, 2012).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 759.
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example, the Court specifically identified the constraints of the
Establishment Clause, while strongly suggesting laws and
regulations that place restrictions on advocacy of public officials
are outside the scope of the government speech doctrine. 126 In
my view, a government entity engaging in government speech
may be liable under the Equal Protection Clause for creating a
state flag that incorporates a Confederate symbol representing
a continued adherence to racial segregation. I believe a
governmental entity should be held liable under the Equal
Protection Clause for express advocacy of Confederate symbols
that are closely linked to the support of intentional racial
discrimination. If the Equal Protection Clause means anything
it should prohibit Mississippi from promoting a flag that
includes the Confederate battle emblem in the top left corner
because such a flag is unacceptable government speech that
endorses the unequal protection of the law. 127 One
commentator correctly observed how “the Equal Protection
Clause has become a primary tool wielded by litigants and
jurists to reshape American society.” 128 Now is an appropriate
time for courts to reshape their thinking about how the
Mississippi flag, which is tainted by an incorporated
Confederate symbol of racial insubordination, clearly injures a
plaintiff under the equal protection principle, and conclude that
the government speech doctrine is not a bar.
Mississippi’s use of a Confederate symbol in its state flag
creates a situation that undermines the equal protection
principle because the state flag is government speech that
conflicts with the Carolene Court’s expanding of effective
political process expression for racial minorities. 129
126. Id.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
128. Brian R. Markley, Constitutional Provisions in Conflict: Article III Standing and
Equal Protection After Shaw v. Reno, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 449, 449 (1995).
129. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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The Carolene Court outlined its new vision of political process
expression for racial minorities in extremely expansive terms. 130
The Court refused to constrain its future intervention to easy
incidents where African Americans or another oppressed people
were rejected at the polls and generally not allowed to
effectively engage in the fundamental rights of political
expression. 131 Carolene recommended a role for the judiciary
that would remain robust even if every adult American had
exercised his or her right to be involved in politics.
The Carolene footnote four rationale supports the argument
that in a hypothetical world where African Americans voted at
the same proportionality rates as whites, and where election
districts accurately followed the Court’s reapportionment
decisions, African Americans would nonetheless hold, as a
result of their discreteness and insularity, a disproportionately
underrepresented amount of power in shaping legislative
policy—an inequality great enough to justify a judicial decision
that a nondiscriminatory democratic process would produce
results analytically to advance the concerns of African
Americans and other disliked minorities. 132
The Mississippi flag, with its incorporated Confederate
flag symbol, is unconstitutional government speech. In the real
world because of their discreteness and insularity, racial
minorities in Mississippi do not possess enough political power
to successfully challenge Mississippi’s endorsement of the
Confederate flag without judicial intervention. 133 It is
constitutionally correct to assert that the Mississippi flag with
its incorporated Confederate symbol is government speech
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 134 However, this constitutionally correct
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

138

See id.
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985).
Id. at 715–16.
Id. at 716.
Robert J. Bein, Stained Flags: Public Symbols and Equal Protection, 28 SETON
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declaration that state sponsorship of a Confederate symbol,
specifically the Confederate flag, violates the right to equal
protection should not remain abstract academic theory. 135
Federal courts must now recognize that Mississippi’s
incorporation of a Confederate symbol in its state flag creates
an unacceptable race-based government speech that is the
proximate cause of a public injury-in-fact to racial minorities.
Although the government’s racially discriminatory
speech may be consistent with free speech values, this does not
suggest that the message is tolerable, because the Equal
Protection Clause serves separate goals. 136 The main objective
of the Free Speech Clause is to promote democratic selfgovernance by accommodating a marketplace of both political
and non-political ideas. 137 The state is most likely to sponsor
racially discriminatory symbolic speech when the expression of
approval for Confederate symbols and racial segregation is
politically popular with majority of its constituency. 138 Thus,
“hateful government expression often targets unpopular
minorities in situations when ordinary political accountability
measures would provide no meaningful remedy, thus increasing
the importance of identifying some means of constitutional
redress.” 139 Unlike the Free Speech Clause, the primary goal
of the Equal Protection Clause is to overcome barriers to full
equality that are based on racial and other status. 140 “Hateful
government speech that reinforces traditional patterns of
hierarchy by communicating a message of exclusion or

HALL L. REV. 897, 900 (1998).
135. Id. at 901.
136. Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 169 (2012).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 170.
139. Id. (citing Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Putting Down: Expressive Subordination and Equal
Protection, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 112, 115 (2012)).
140. Id. at 170–71.
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inferiority based on class status thus offends an antisubordination view of the Equal Protection Clause.” 141
Moore argues that the Confederate flag, as incorporated
in the Mississippi flag, is an unconstitutional symbolic
government speech supporting illegal race-based subordination,
and can be reasonably understood to violate the Fourteen
Amendment’s anti-subordination equal protection rationale. 142
The federal district court denied Moore an opportunity to
show that the Mississippi state flag, with an incorporated
Confederate symbol, is unconstitutional when the court
decided he lacked standing to oppose the flag because he did
not suffer a personal injury-in-fact. 143 The conventional case or
controversy mandate of Article III limits the judiciary to
accepting only those cases that can be traditionally resolved by
the judicial process. 144 A significant doctrine the Court has
utilized to protect habitual restraint on the judicial process is
standing. 145
James Coleman sued to stop the flying of the Georgia
state flag above Georgia’s state operated workplaces. 146
Coleman, an African American, understood that such a display
of the Georgia flag, which at the time included the Confederate
battle flag symbol, was government speech that infringed upon
his collective right to the equal protection of the law. 147 Because
Southern history matters, the court in Miller had judicial notice
that flying the Georgia flag with an incorporated Confederate
symbol had disproportionate effects along racial lines;
therefore, Coleman’s equal protection claim should have been

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

140

Id. at 171.
Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).

Id.

Hessick, supra note 29, at 276.

Id.

Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 527 (11th Cir. 1997).

See id.
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accepted and not rejected. 148 An African American plaintiff
should not be required to show obvious disproportionate
impact by means of racial lines by producing specific factual
evidence to demonstrate that a state flag that includes a
Confederate symbol, in this case the Confederate flag, inflicts a
considerable subordination burden upon African Americans as a
group that is not experienced by whites. The disproportionate
impact of racial subordination is a self-evident proposition
because state sponsorship of the Confederate flag is plainly
understood as government speech inviting and encouraging
racial discrimination by whites. 149
The Confederate battle flag symbolizes a governmental
philosophy dedicated to preserving a divisive society where only
whites were entitled to liberty and equality. 150 “The continued
glorification of Confederate symbols in official venues around
the country, and especially in the South, reflects an
unwillingness to abide by the full scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which bans all badges of servitude.” 151 A current
exhibition of the Confederate battle flag by a state government
in a glorified place above state owned buildings and on official
state logos is an ugly reminder that, while slavery is no longer
legal in America, “some of its vestiges linger in American
culture.” 152 “Governmental incorporation of Confederate
symbols . . . encourages the uninhibited expression of racism
through unfair hiring practices and hate crimes.” 153
The Eleventh Circuit all but conceded that the Georgia
State flag, which included the Confederate flag symbol,
represented government speech with a racially discriminatory

148.
149.
150.

Contra id. at 529–30.
Contra id. at 530.
Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment

Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 543 (2002).
151. Id. at 558–59.
152. Id. at 559.
153. Id. at 556.
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purpose because the state flag was approved as part of Georgia’s
public leaders’ crusade to reject the Supreme Court’s school
desegregation decisions. 154 In 1956, Georgia’s Governor
Marvin Griffin said, “there will be no mixing of the races in
public schools, in college classrooms in Georgia as long as I am
Governor.” 155 Anti-desegregation public officials in Georgia
raised and resurrected the Confederate battle flag as expressive
governmental speech to demonstrate their disdain for even the
thought of integrated public schools. Those who lost the Civil
War and the battle to preserve a separate but unequal society
based on race have used the Confederate flag as government
speech symbolizing resistance to both racial integration and
racial equality. It is reasonable to declare Southern resistance to
racial integration, including celebrating Confederate war
symbols, as government speech. The message: Blacks’ fight for
freedom and justice was a lost cause because the white South
would rise again to overcome racial justice.
The Article III standing requirement allows a person the
right to challenge a state’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag
as a racially biased symbol that causes constitutional injury to
those who oppose race-based subordination. 156 Since the
Confederate flag incorporated in Mississippi’s flag endorses
pervasive racial discrimination, the lower federal courts should
appropriately abandon conventional standing principles to cure
a state’s equal protection violation. 157 When a state flag
incorporates the Confederate flag into its official or de facto
state flag, it endorses the discredited separate but equal

154. Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d at 528 n.3 (“In 1954, the Supreme Court declared
racially segregated public schools unconstitutional, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (‘Brown I ’), and, a year later, the Court ordered that the desegregation of public schools
proceed ‘with all deliberate speed.’ Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (‘Brown
II’)”).
155. Id. at 528.
156. Markley, supra note 128, at 452.
157. Id.
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principle. 158 “Racist symbols, placed conspicuously in public
places, have the effect of bolstering persons resolved to act on
racist ideology.” 159 As a matter of fact specific “[h]ate groups
that have incorporated the same Confederate symbols into
logos, such as the KKK and Aryan Nation, are keenly aware
that they are joined by some state governments in lauding
the Confederate cause and its heroes.” 160 In Coleman v. Miller,
the court explicitly implemented the historical-ly wrongheaded
personal injury-in-fact standing theory to justify its conclusion
that a state’s intentional racially discriminatory endorsement of
the Confederate flag is not a violation of the equal protection
principle. 161 Intentional discrimination against a racial group
that cannot be corrected by the political process should be
acknowledged as a public injury-in-fact under an antisubordination political process rationale. 162
A proper, historically correct understanding of the
standing doctrine and the equal protection principle supports
the conclusion that Mississippi is prohibited from endorsing the
pre-Civil War concept of separate but equal established in
Roberts v. City of Boston. 163 After the Civil War and the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court of the United States nevertheless
approved the separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v.
Ferguson. 164 Any plausible reading of Plessy leads to the
unavoidable conclusion that the Supreme Court gave its
approval to state-sponsored racial discrimination against
African Americans in spite of the language in the Equal

158. See Tsesis, supra note 150, at 558.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Coleman v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
162. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
163. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). See also Sunstein, supra
note 25, at 167.
164. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Protection Clause, which clearly appears to prohibit racial
discrimination against blacks and others who are not white. 165
The discredited separate but equal doctrine, when endorsed by
the state sponsorship of a Confederate flag, may reasonably be
viewed as a state granting the racially insensitive a license to
engage in racial discrimination.
An objective observer could reasonably regard
Mississippi’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag as symbolic
government speech perpetuating illegitimate sympathy for Jim
Crow racial discrimination. Mississippi should not be
permitted, by incorporating the Confederate flag into its state
flag, to encourage the racial separation of people or to burden
people with a race-based Confederate flag that symbolizes the
perceived racial inferiority of African Americans. 166 Mississippi
should not be allowed to engage in government speech that
promotes a perception of racial inferiority for nonwhites. 167
Conversely, this perception of racial inferiority of nonwhites
and its connection to Mississippi’s government speech
endorsing a race-based Confederate flag is very likely to
perpetuate a feeling of racial superiority in the minds and hearts
of unthinking whites in a manner unlikely to end anytime
soon. 168 Unfortunately, Moore v. Bryant joins the courts that
have not recognized that standing rules without the personal
injury-in-fact requirement allow an equal protection objection
to a state’s endorsement of the Confederate flag. 169 A
misapplication of the standing doctrine occurs when a court
fails to recognize that the Confederate flag, when incorporated
into the Mississippi flag, should be treated as a virtual Jim Crow
racial classification. 170 Symbolic racial classifications supporting
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

144

Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).

Id.
See id.
Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834 (S.D. Miss. 2016).

See Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s
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Jim Crow Confederate symbols, when endorsed by Mississippi,
produce a concrete public injury. 171

B. Mississippi’s Flag Represents a Racially Tainted Political
Process that Produces Racially Tainted Government Speech
Mississippi’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag should
also be treated as a tainted state political process issue inspired
by Jim Crow policies that racial minorities have not been able
to correct. 172 Mississippi’s endorsement of the Confederate flag
as its official flag is constitutionally suspect government speech
because the state’s white majority continues to burden its black
minority with a racially insensitive Jim Crow flag. 173 Since
African Americans are unable to use a tainted political process
to remove the Confederate flag symbol as government speech,
the political process rationale requires judicial intervention to
prevent Mississippi from using its flag as a daily reminder of
racial subordination. 174 In February 2001, the Mississippi
legislature scheduled a special election for April 17, 2001, and
voters decided to keep the current flag with its Confederate
symbol and rejected a replacement design without the
Confederate symbol. 175 “The special election results
substantially favored the 1894 flag, with 65% voting to keep it
and 35% favoring the alternate design. It once again was the
State’s official banner.” 176
The rationale of footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products applies to the Mississippi flag because the
state display of the flag is not entitled to the presumption of
Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 791, 816 (2008).
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175.
176.

Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 846 (S.D. Miss. 2016).

Id.
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constitutionality. The Mississippi flag, as symbolic government
speech, virtually appears on its face to be within the specific
prohibition of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. 177
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from
engaging in government speech that promotes a message of a
superior race. 178 Courts must acknowledge that the white voting
majority in Mississippi and blind loyalty to a false Southern
heritage disable the political process. Mississippi’s tainted
political process cannot effect a repeal of the display of a
racially subordinating Confederate government speech symbol
in the state flag. Mississippi’s incorporation of the Confederate
flag symbol in its flag is so inherently suspect that the state
should be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 179
A legitimate Southern heritage would not hide behind a
Confederate flag government speech symbol representing a
white supremacy state of mind. The real Southern heritage
acknowledges its entire Southern people regardless of race. For
example, the author is very happy to be black and a real
Southerner. True Southerners know that all lives matter, and
false Southerners are all too quick to forget all lives matter,
including black lives. If it is true that in the South all lives
matter equally, then a Confederate flag representing
government speech promoting racial discrimination against
people because the color of their skin represents an offense to
true Southern fundamental fairness. Without fundamental
fairness to everyone in the South, Southern hospitality is a
mere myth.
The expressive governmental speech symbol of the
Confederate flag inside the Mississippi flag intentionally directs
its racial prejudice against discrete and insular racial
177.
178.
179.

146

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

See id.
See id.
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minorities. 180 The racial subordination represented by the
Mississippi flag cannot be corrected by a tainted political
process that abandons minorities rather than protecting
them. 181 When a state’s political process fails to protect racial
minorities from a state flag representing racial discrimination, a
more searching judicial inquiry, now known as strict scrutiny, is
needed. 182 Strict scrutiny is needed because Mississippi’s flag
represents racially divisive governmental speech that violates
equal protection. Mississippi could acknowledge an inclusive,
truly race neutral Southern heritage in its flag with a race
neutral magnolia, a Southern symbol. When a state engages in
government speech by supporting the Confederate flag symbol,
it communicates an illegitimate message that incites sympathy
for racial inequality in violation of equal protection of the law.
Regardless of the degree of psychological knowledge available
when Plessy v. Ferguson was decided, courts now should
recognize that a government speech message of racial
inferiority conveyed about African Americans creates a publicplace, psychological group injury to the members of the
stigmatized group. 183 Any unreasonable reading of Plessy v.
Ferguson supporting a finding of no concrete public harm
under a false standing doctrine should be rejected. 184 Because
the Confederate flag symbol as government speech is so closely
connected to the doctrine of “separate but equal,” it has no
place in the Mississippi state flag. 185 If racially separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal, then it stands to
reason that a Confederate flag representing the government
speech of white supremacy in Mississippi also inherently

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).

Id. at 494–95.
Id. at 495.
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deprives an African American plaintiff “the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 186
Government speech endorsing the Confederate flag
plays the race card without any legitimate reason. If the
constitutional theory of “equal protection of the laws” has any
significance at all, it is clear that, even under its simplest
application, it has to signify that a state-sponsored plan to send
messages of racial subordination to “a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,” 187
even if the message is only expressed by government speech. In
1970, the adoption of the Confederate flag at Southside High
School in Muncie, Indiana, was unsuccessfully challenged as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 188 The school’s
conduct could easily have been seen by a reasonable person as
government speech by a school endorsing the lost cause of
white supremacy. After Southside opened in 1962, the students
were permitted under established school board policy to adopt
the Confederate flag as the school flag and designate the
school’s athletic teams the Rebels. 189 In a 1968 report entitled
“Student Friction and Racial Unrest at Southside High School,
Muncie, Indiana” to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, the Indiana State Advisory Committee recommended
that the school stop using the Confederate flag at Southside
High School without delay because “it is [virtually] impossible
for [African American] students to feel loyal to a school whose
official symbols represent a system that enslaved their
ancestors.” 190
The conclusion that the Southside High plaintiffs made
no showing of racial or political discrimination should be

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

148

Id.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
Banks v. Muncie Cmty. Sch., 433 F.2d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1970).

Id.
Id.
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rejected because of the school intentionally adopted a separate
but equal Confederate flag symbol, which a reasonable observer
is substantially certain to perceive as government speech
endorsing racial discrimination and white supremacy. 191 A
school board policy that approved the use of a Confederate flag,
which constituted “measurable” racially subordinating
government speech, at Southside High [was] racially neutral in
name only. 192 Since the racially subordinating Confederate flag
is substantially certain to be viewed as racially discriminatory
government speech, a state-sponsored display of the flag should
be considered an act of intentional racial discrimination. 193 An
intentional school board policy that permits students to use a
Confederate flag as a school symbol is government speech that
should be treated the same as a policy that contains a racial
classification on its face because of the flag’s connection to
slavery and subordination. 194 No inquiry into legislative policy
is needed because the racially discriminatory nature of the
Confederate flag, as government speech supporting
subordination, is self-evident. 195

V. MISSISSIPPI’S PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES ARE PLAUSIBLE
SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFFS TO CHALLENGE THE
STATE’S SPONSORSHIP OF A CONFEDERATE SYMBOL
IN ITS OFFICIAL FLAG
The Ninth Circuit’s statement in Washington v.
Trump 196 that Washington and Minnesota had standing to
assert their own rights and rights of third parties may help to

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Contra id.
Bein, supra note 134, at 917.
Id. at 917–18.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).

Id.
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017).
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identify potential successful plaintiffs to challenge Mississippi’s
sponsorship of a Confederate symbol. On January 27, 2017,
President Trump issued Executive Order 13769 entitled
“Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the
United States.” 197 After referring to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the Executive Order declared, “numerous
foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in
terrorism-related crimes.” 198 The Executive Order proclaims
“the United States must ensure that those admitted to this
country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding
principles.” 199 The power of the Executive Order was instant
and extensive. 200 “It was reported that thousands of visas were
immediately canceled, hundreds of travelers with such visas
were prevented from boarding airplanes bound for the United
States or denied entry on arrival, and some travelers were
detained.” 201
Washington alleged that the Executive Order, among other
things, unconstitutionally damaged the State’s economy and
public universities in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 202
Particularly relevant for the purposes of my analysis, schools
have been permitted to assert the rights of their students. 203
Since the interests of the States’ universities are aligned with
their students for purposes of conventional Article III
standing, 204 Mississippi universities may be the plaintiffs’ bestpositioned to establish standing to challenge the Mississippi flag
with its Confederate symbol. “The students’ educational
success is ‘inextricably bound up’ in the universities’ capacity to

197.
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teach them . . . [a]nd the universities’ reputations depend on the
success of their professors’ research.” 205
By analogy, a Mississippi university may assert not only
its own rights (to the extent that the university is harmed by the
Mississippi flag’s incorporation of a Confederate symbol of
racial subordination), but the state university may also assert
the right of its students and faculty to a competitive educational
experience. If the facts demonstrate that a disproportionate
number of well-regarded professors refuse to come to a
Mississippi university to teach or conduct research because of
Mississippi’s official flag, the university’s students and faculty
have suffered an injury-in-fact. Once a Mississippi university
demonstrates its students have suffered an injury-in-fact
because of the loss of an opportunity to recruit a competitive
faculty, the third party standing rules allow the affected
Mississippi university to sue the State of Mississippi on behalf
of its students to remove the official flag of racial
subordination. 206

VI.CONCLUSION
Confederate symbols are currently impacting American
and Southern life 207 although they essentially vanished into the
wind once the Civil War ended. 208 White Southerners returned
to Confederate symbols to demonstrate their resistance to the
Civil Rights movement. 209 A longing to continue the practice of
racial segregation and racial discrimination against African
Americans
in
the United States inspired the reappearance of Confederate sy

205.
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209.
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Id.
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m-bols. 210 In 1948, the Confederate flag developed into a
powerful political symbol of white support for racial
segregation during the Dixiecrat revolt after Strom Thurmond
organized a demonstration by white Southerners at the
Democratic National Convention to picket against President
Harry S. Truman’s endorsement of civil rights. 211 Many others
followed the practice begun by the Dixiecrats of waving the
Confederate flag to challenge any movement toward racial
equality. 212 After the show the Dixiecrats put on at the
Democratic convention in 1948, the Confederate flag
represented white supremacy and a rejection of equal rights for
African Americans because of their race. 213
A real issue, not appropriately addressed in any of the
opinions challenging the state sponsorship of a Confederate
flag symbol in its official flag, implicates the correct description
of the injury. 214 To understand the point, it may be necessary to
remember the standing problem before the Court in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke. 215 Bakke could not
demonstrate that but for the affirmative action plan he
opposed, he would have been accepted into the medical school
of the University of California at Davis. 216 A plausible argument
was made that Bakke would not qualify for standing under the
Article III requirement of injury-in-fact. 217
According to Sunstein, the Court addressed the standing
issue in Bakke in a manner that, in theory, has allowed it to find
injury-in-fact without technically abandoning its conventional
approach to standing. 218 “What happened here was that
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
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the Bakke Court found injury, causation, and redressability by
the simple doctrinal device of recharacterizing the injury.” 219
“In Bakke, the Court described the injury as involving not
admission to medical school but the [lack of] opportunity to
compete on equal terms.” 220 Similarly, in Allen v. Wright, 221 the
Court could “have recharacterized the injury as an opportunity
not to have the desegregation process distorted by the
incentives created through the grant of unlawful tax deductions
to private schools.” 222 The contextual racial subordination of
minorities occurs when a state sponsors a Confederate symbol
in its official flag. The courts should recharacterize the plaintiff
injury challenging Mississippi’s flag as an opportunity not to
have the concept of the equal protection of the law distorted by
the racially tainted government speech endorsing the
discredited separate but equal doctrine. 223
In sum, the contemporary standing law and personal injuryin-fact requirement represents a revisionist interpretation of
Article III that is not actually mandated under Article III. I have
taken the position that the judges in the Confederate flag cases,
who have blindly followed the private injury-in-fact
requirement of standing, have denied deserving plaintiffs who
are descendants of slaves relief from state-sponsored speech in
the form of Confederate symbols that send a message of white
supremacy. Accordingly, federal courts should recognize that
any individual living in Mississippi has a right to challenge
Mississippi’s usage of a state flag with a Confederate symbol,
which violates the Equal Protection Clause.
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